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This study employs an experimental design to test the effects of branding, 
presence of opinion, and gender on news credibility.  A history of credibility theory in 
social science research is explored in order to contextualize investigation of truth and 
objectivity in the contemporary fragmented news landscapes.  The goal is to contribute to 
the academic methodologies employed in the exploration of credibility in news as well as 
make practical suggestions to news makers.  Results of the empirical methods in this 
thesis showed that belief in the news organization from a pretest was positively correlated 
with the credibility ratings of the individual story conditions but previously held beliefs 
about story topic were not.  Neutral stories were rated higher in terms of credibility than 
those with opinion statements regardless of brand or belief in the news institution. A 
scale for personal acceptance of opinion in news is proposed to provide credibility 
theorists a way to unobtrusively measure predilection for opinion news. While no 
differences in gender were found using the newly-proposed scale, an individual’s 
propensity to trust was positively correlated with acceptance of opinion in news. 
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Audience specialization in news should lead to specialized studies of credibility, 
particularly the roles of gender information processing in relation to objectivity, opinion, 
and credibility.   
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
 News credibility in America is in a dangerous free-fall.  The Pew Center for 
People and the Press data reveals that credibility has hit a two-decade low (2009), and 
negative opinions of the news media are at an all-time high (2011).  The American public 
is increasingly finding news organizations to be inaccurate, biased, and less trustworthy 
in their coverage.  The low regard the public holds for the American news media should 
be taken very seriously considering the “heightened role” the media plays in modern 
democracy (Jones, 2004).  However, how credibility is being measured across time and 
medium is far too disparate.  Pew often uses a single survey question (believability) to 
define credibility.  While it has often been noted in the realm of mass media research 
dating back to 1950 that credibility is synonymous with believability (Hovland & Weiss, 
1951; K. A. Johnson & Wiedenbeck, 2009; Severin & Tankard, 2001), this simplistic 
understanding of this axiom of journalism is problematic.     
Current mass communication research by and large conceptualizes credibility as a 
series of dichotomous components including trust, accuracy, depth, bias, objectivity, etc.  
While much historic and contemporary literature relates the evolution of measuring 
credibility within the mass media, studies rarely account for the legitimacy an individual 
might place on the different components, especially objectivity and acceptance of bias or 
opinion in his or her news.  A one-sided story can still invariably be found credible by an 
individual under certain circumstances.  While objectivity and bias continue to be 
prominent components in credibility studies, there is also research to indicate that bias 
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may improve credibility in some cases, and that opinionated news with the admission of 
bias increases perceived transparency resulting in a more positive audience reaction.  
Bias and lack of complete objectivity are not seen as an ultimate evil. 
“Where objective news strives to present both sides of a story, it also places 
unproductive restraints on political inquiry and expression; partisan media, though 
one-sided, open the door to alternative ideas and, in doing so, encourage more 
critical and engaged politics” (Feldman, 2009).   
 
To further complicate matters, positive response bias appears to be a real problem in such 
research, where a positive response to all items on a credibility matrix corresponds with a 
positive credibility score.  It is a “check the box” mentality (in paper surveys) and a 
“yeah, yeah, yeah” mentality in phone surveys. 
 Large-scale studies such as those conducted by Pew and Gallup and even smaller 
research projects at the university level cannot commit the time and resources into asking 
the “why” and instead focus on the “what”.  As a result, few studies explore how an 
individual processes news in terms of credibility.  The cognitive process of credibility 
assessment on an individual level is an important avenue of research that is currently 
neglected.  Additionally, there is little research done into the cognitive processing of 
credibility perceptions by gender.  While the field of advertising as well as psychology 
have vast literatures on gendered information processing, less has been done in the 
journalism discipline, and what has been done has focused on news information seeking 
and audience segmentation, specifically the history of hard versus soft news.  In terms of 
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academic research, the focus has mainly been on men and women as subjects of the 
news, shadowing women as news makers as well as consumers (Herzog, 1941; Lavie & 
Lehman-Wilzig, 2005; Radway, 1985; Press, 1991).  Since credibility perception is 
universalized, little research explores credibility on a humanistic, individual level.  
Research in the field of advertising and psychology tell us that men and women process 
and evaluate information differently; women have often been portrayed as more 
subjective and intuitive, valuing subjective criteria, while men value objective criteria 
(Broverman et al., 1968).  Additionally, Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran (1991) found that 
women utilize more elaborate message processing techniques than men.  Along with 
information and message processing, information transmission is contingent on gendered 
differences, as in the Haas 1979 study that reported that female language is interpretive, 
subjective, and evaluative, while male language tends to be selective and concentrates on 
available objective facts.  However, a proposed selectivity model was supported by Daley 
and Smith (1995) that showed that men do not always favor objective claims and that 
women favor objective and subjective claims similarly, until risk (in this case, in 
advertising) is increased; then they favor objective claims (Daley & Smith, 1995).  
According to selectivity models (Meyers-Levy, 1989; Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 
1991; Meyers-Levy & Stemthal, 1991), men process information on a selective level 
rather than comprehensive level.  Women, on the other hand, tend to employ a 
comprehensive strategy of information processing that attempts to synthesize all available 
information.  Men rely more on cues that tend to be particularly salient or readily 
available in context.  This thesis expands credibility theory into the realm of information 
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processing by gender by looking at specific differences between genders in terms of 
preference for objective (opinion-based) versus subjective (fact-based) claims. 
There are also a number of feminist scholars that criticize the use of “objectivity” 
as the ultimate tenant of journalism, since a search for objectivity is “antithetical” to a 
feminist perspective of the world (Lavie & Lehman-Wilzig, 2005); the concept of 
objectivity, indeed, is rooted in patriarchal origins.  If one thing is clear, it is that 
credibility perceptions cannot be categorized as gender-free. Considering the complex 
ways of processing information as well as the varying importance that women and men 
place on objectivity versus subjectivity in that processing, why are all components in 
credibility models given equal weight and importance if males and females (or simpler 
still, individuals) potentially value and process various components of credibility 
differently?  Is objectivity in news an inherently “male” concept, and what does that mean 
for subjectivity (in the form of opinion) finding a home in the core news product?  By 
asking and proposing answers to these questions, this thesis will contribute to the dearth 
of information on the intersection of gender and credibility theory. 
 This thesis also provides an in-depth literature review on credibility constructs 
and models used in mass communication research, spanning both journalism and 
advertising disciplines, in an attempt to put credibility in an historical and ultimately 
humanistic context.  An experiment was conducted to explore the relationships among 
previously held beliefs on news story topic, news brand believability, acceptance of 
opinion in news, gender, and credibility.  Participants read one of nine news stories, 
where opinion statements (both pro-issue and anti-issue) towards life in prison for 
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juveniles were manipulated along with news organization branding.   By exploring these 
links, the conception of objectivity as credibility is challenged and conventional 
credibility theories are tested.  A core news product devoid of ideological branding and 
one-sided opinion is just as important to a free press and society as the freedom to 
express personal opinion through the mass media.  Audience fragmentation teeters 
dangerously between promoting free, engaging thought and encouraging preferential 
close-mindedness.  Individuals should be able to freely comment on the news media as 
well as have access to diverse content, but a credible and unbiased source for news 
should be available to lend significance to freedom of expression.   In the current 
fractured news media market of cable and online news where selective attention and 
exposure are commonplace, it is important to explore biased, opinion-laden news and its 
relationship to audience members, which should be of great interest to journalists trying 
to earn the trust of those audience members. 
 This thesis looks at the evolution of credibility studies in modern journalism and 
bridges the components of the familiar constructs of credibility, such as objectivity and 
bias, and places them in the context of a fractured news media market where 
individualized choice among a set of “I want it now”-style consumers is unexceptional.  
It is the goal of this thesis to contribute an updated conceptualization of the common 
components of credibility to the body of academic literature as well as make practical 
suggestions to journalism decision makers across the United States.  As credibility ratings 
for major news organizations continue to plummet and news consumers relay mixed 
messages about what they want in terms of balanced news coverage that is free from 
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opinion, relying on outmoded information-gathering techniques and credibility scales to 
measure the media landscape is perilous, as is ignoring how women and men 
process/engage with core and/or supplementary opinion-based news products. Credibility 




Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
 
CREDIBILITY 
A Credibility Snapshot 
 There is little to no debate about the inherent relevance of credibility to American 
news media as an institution.  However, credibility of the news media across mediums 
has been in a free-fall since the Watergate era of watchdog journalism.  Woodward and 
Bernstein of the Washington Post are often credited for invigorating the public regarding 
the watchdog function as well as inspiring a generation of investigative reporters in the 
modern era.  After the Nixon controversy settled, trust in government was inversely 
related to trust in newspapers; newspaper credibility was up, trust in government 
institutions was down.  In the mid 1970’s, 30% of Americans reported having a “great 
deal” of confidence in the press as an institution (Jones, 2004).  The 1980’s saw a drastic 
drop in credibility as well as a rise in the theory that credibility declines were responsible 
for and/or related to the downward trend of household newspaper penetration (Meyer, 
1988).  According to the Pew Research Center for People and the Press, only 33% of 
respondents believe all or most of the news reported by the survey’s most credible 
source, 60 Minutes.  A recent 2011 Pew study on news organization perceptions also 
found that a full 66% of respondents felt that news stories are often inaccurate, a number 
that has nearly doubled since 1985 when Pew first asked the question (Pew, 2011).  
Belief in the ability of news organizations to “get the facts straight” has also rapidly 
declined since 1985 (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: News Organization Accuracy.  Data Source: Pew, 2011.1 
 
In 1974, public opinion polls showed that 68% of the population had trust and 
confidence in the news media (Gallup, 2009).  While there has been little change in 
credibility ratings since 2000 (see Table 1), credibility continues to fall; American news 
outlets have become incredibly polarized in terms of credibility.  While Fox News was 
rated as the fifth most-believable news outlet and MSNBC was eighth, 41% of 
Republicans rated Fox News as credible, but only 21% of Democrats did.  Thirty-four 
percent of Democrats found MSNBC credible but only 13% of Republicans agreed.  The 
New York Times was also rated relatively low in credibility, with only 20% of 
respondents reporting they could believe all or most of the news reported therein.  
                                               
1 These graphs are elaborated by the author using Pew Research Center for The People and the Press data, 
2011.  Pew does not bear any responsibility on the conclusions and visualizations herby presented. 
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Interestingly, local daily newspapers fared similarly to the New York Times, with 21% 
being rated as credible.   
NPR was the only news outlet to improve credibility since 1998; both CNN and 
the Wall Street Journal have suffered double-digit-percentage declines in credibility.  It is 
unknown what if any effect the recent scandal involving secretly taped comments at an 
NPR fundraiser, the firing of conservative analyst Juan Williams, and the resignation of 
NPR President and CEO Vivian Schiller will have on future credibility ratings of NPR.  
In terms of Internet news, Pew found that these outlets were viewed with more 
skepticism than print and broadcast, with less than a fourth of online news sources 
garnering credible ratings. 
Table 1: Trends in News Believability by Brand  
Outlet 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 
New York Times -- -- 21% 20% 18% 20% 
Fox News 26% 24% 25% 25% 23% 27% 
MSNBC 28% 28% 22% 21% 24% 22% 
 
Source: Pew, 2010.  Percents reflect how much the audience can believe “all or most” of 
what organization says 
 
Measuring Credibility 
As noted by Kohring and Matthes (2007), research into media credibility has 
fallen under three methodological categories:  source credibility, comparing credibility 
across different mediums (e.g. television, radio, online), and factor analysis studies that 
attempt to identify different dimensions of credibility.  This study seeks to contribute to 
the theory of credibility by taking a multi-disciplinary approach that bridges different 
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avenues of credibility research.  Scholars note the important distinction between “source” 
credibility and “message” credibility.  Source credibility can be understood as a person, 
organization, or the means of transmitting the message rather than the message itself 
(Johnson & Wiedenbeck, 2009), and the different aspects of source credibility appear to 
be the most important when assessing information (Eastin, 2001; Fogg, et al., 2002).  
Source credibility in a digital age can be as macro as an institution such as the New York 
Times or as micro as the lone political blogger.  McQuail (2005) said, “It is the quality of 
the source rather than the information that matters” (p.201).  This important distinction 
must be made in research that includes variables that measure branding; branding in the 
form of a logo is a visual source credibility cue and is employed in this current study as a 
manipulation.   
Quality of the source credibility also has been shown to vary across medium; 
Newhagen and Nass (1989) found that the audience determines credibility by assessing 
the individual presenting the news while newspapers are assessed as larger institutions.   
Additionally, as Hovland et. al observed in 1954, we are dealing with “perceptions”.  
Credibility is perceived by the receiver of a message, not comprised of specific objective 
criteria (Jones, Moore, Stanaland, & Wyatt, 1998).  Here, we can distinguish between 
“actual” credibility and “perceived” credibility.  “Actual” credibility can be described as 
a set of objective fact-based criteria and should be further distinguished from perceived 
credibility.  For example, this current study explores bias and objectivity as observable 
(and manipulatable) variables in news stories; this study seeks to influence perceived 
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credibility with a variety of manipulations.  This study does not manipulate fact-based 
claims that would address “actual” credibility.        
Dimensions of Credibility 
A rich and complex history of research into media credibility has not rendered 
anything approaching a standardized scale for measuring the concept.  It has been 
empirically measured with as few as one item (see Pew, 2009 and 2010), but defended by 
others as a multidimensional concept with numerous components (e.g. Gaziano & 
McGrath, 1986; Jacobson, 1969; Johnson & Wiedenbeck , 2009; Lee, 1978; Munter, 
1986; Whitehead, 1968) Often, semantic dissimilarities are overcome and “trust” and 
“credibility” research are interchanged.  Some of the earliest measurements of media 
credibility began in the 1950’s when the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research 
began measuring credibility in various polls, where, as previously noted, credibility was 
treated as synonymous with believability (Hovland & Weiss, 1951).    
In 1954, Hovland and colleagues first suggested the two-dimensional measure of 
source credibility: “trustworthiness" and "expertise”.  This model/definition of credibility 
was challenged in 1969 by Berlo, Lemert, and Mertz, who criticized Hovland and his 
colleagues for portraying credibility, among other things, as a “static attribute of the 
source” and called for empirical evidence to establish specific criteria used by message 
receivers when evaluating a source. 
Whitehead (1968) further expanded on the work of Hovland and Weiss; he 
identified five dominant factors of source credibility as trustworthiness, professionalism 
or competence, objectivity, and the important addition of dynamism (Whitehead Jr, 
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1968).  Dynamism is seen as a vital component when credibility is studied in conjunction 
with persuasion.  A year later, Jacobson (1969) measured credibility along 20 pairs of 
adjectives, leading to the two credibility-based factors of “authenticity” and “objectivity” 
as well as two dimensions termed “non-credibility-based dimensions”  of “dynamism” 
and “respite”.  These early studies dealt with communication models in general.  It was 
later in 1985 when The American Society of Newspaper Editors conducted credibility 
research that incorporated more specific journalistic concerns of credibility including fact 
versus opinion, reader preference, and sensationalism, resulting in a 12 item credibility 
factor (ASNE, 1985). 
Around the same time,  research by Gaziano and McGrath (1986) took the classic 
Whitehead scale and expanded it to a twelve point credibility index which included 
components such as depth of information,  perceived bias, fairness,  and concern for the 
public’s best interests (see Table 2).  They noted that additional subdivision in the index 
was possible, a concept that Rimmer and Weaver (1987) later used to relate media use to 
media credibility. Munter (1986, 1987) proposed a five-dimensional model of source 
credibility (later simplified to four by combining the components of goodwill and 
fairness) in which she synthesized research by social-power theorists, French and Raven 





Table 2: Credibility Factors, Gaziano & McGrath 
Item 
Unbiased 
Tells the whole story 
Can be trusted 
Separates facts from opinions 
Accurate 
Fair 
Respects people’s privacy 
Reporters are well trained 
Factual 
Patriotic 
Concerned about the community’s well-being 
Concerned mainly about the public interest 
Watches out after your interests 
 
Data Source: Meyer, 1988 
 
In 1988, P. Meyer took an important step in conceptualization of credibility scales 
and indexes by reviewing and validating historic measurements.  He took exception with 
Gaziano and McGrath’s indices, since while valid on face value, they were hampered by, 
“the absence of any theory to inform their interpretation” (p. 570).  Gaziano (1987) 
defended the analysis in a personal communication, saying it, “allowed respondents 
themselves to define credibility rather than imposing an academic definition on them.”  
This is the approach of this thesis, which considers credibility to be individually defined 
and weighted differently for individuals on the key components of objectivity and bias.  
The result of Meyer’s attempt to establish an academic definition of credibility linked to 
prior, established constructs was an index that included five pairs of adjectives for 
credibility: fair/unfair, unbiased/biased, tells the whole story/doesn’t tell the whole story, 
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accurate/inaccurate, and can be trusted, can’t be trusted (p. 574), along with a second 
factor encompassing “social affiliation”. 
This scale was further validated in 1994 when West tested Meyer’s and Gaziano-
McGrath’s scales with new data as well as Meyer’s original data.  To West (1995), the 
Gaziano-McGrath scales were, “the only set of scales for the measurement of media 
credibility to have undergone validation” (p. 160).  West had similar goals to Meyer, that 
is to arrive at a standardized scale to facilitate cross-study comparisons of credibility.  
Unfortunately, these scales have not been consistently applied to contemporary research.  
Researchers have cherry-picked different items for individual purposes.  The idea that 
factors of the credibility construct need to be replicated on different samples as well as 
examined within an established theoretical framework was further criticized by Gorsuch 
(1983).  He added that the accepted approach of factor analytics remained generalizable 
to communication and not specific to journalism.  
In their 2009 study, Johnson and Wiedenbeck conducted an experiment exploring 
elements that enhance perceived credibility of citizen journalism web sites; they provided 
a table of common constructs in the study of credibility that were used for their index, 
which included believability, accuracy, trustworthiness, bias, completeness, etc.   These 
constructs were separated into categories of “perceived credibility”, “site credibility”, and 
“sponsor credibility”.  Important to the advancement of standardized measures of 
credibility within a theoretical context, Johnson and Wiedenbeck noted the additional 
studies where identical credibility criteria were used.  They also included a four-
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dimensional measure of issue salience to control for the reader’s story engagement, a 
component of credibility often ignored in other experimental designs.   
While credibility matrices and constructs are continually amended and revised, 
little has been done to address the universalizing nature of such models, as well as the 
erosion of the importance of objectivity and unbiased news.  While some scholars, 
notably Kelly (1991) argue that credibility is not universal, but rather a psychological 
space unique to individuals and based on subjective experience, others insist on 
frameworks of the “common aspects of credibility assessment regardless of media, type 
of information, and environment of information use” (Hilligoss & Rieh, 2008).  The 
current study acknowledges that common historic constructs do exist for credibility 
assessment, but that individuals place different importance on these components. 
 
OBJECTIVITY AND NEWS 
Audience Fragmentation 
Audience fragmentation plays a huge roll in how credibility is conceptualized in 
the current media landscape, and how prominent opinion claims are in journalism.  
Diversity of media products is closely linked to freedom of the press (Glasser, 1984).  In 
the most general terms, the more diversity in channels of news media and diversity of 
content, the better for freedom.  In 1977, the three major broadcast networks accounted 
for over 90% of all prime-time television viewership by Americans (Veronis, 1994).  
With the emergence of cable and online news, fragmentation of news audiences has 
increased dramatically.  Cable television reaches 60.7% of American households and 
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alternative delivery systems such as satellite providers reach 30.5%, according to the 
TVB analysis of Nielsen Media Research data for November 2010.  As early as 2003, 
Americans had access to over 100 channels (Webster, 2005). There has been a rapid shift 
from a “low-choice” to a “high-choice” news media environment.  Some researchers 
believe this has helped to engage individuals with politics, while others (e.g. Neuman, 
1996) show that increased options lead to less political knowledge, or simply widens the 
gap in political knowledge and turnout (Prior, 2005).   
Media technologies in particularly have been examined for their power to 
fragment audiences (e.g., Chaffee & Metzger, 2001; Havick, 2000).  The primary concern 
of researchers is that the resulting audience will converge in smaller niches that avoid 
opinions that are contrary to their insulated point of view (e.g., Sunstein, 2001; Turow, 
1997; Webster, 2005).   Further complicating tendencies towards self-selected “on-
demand” news is the rise of the use of Internet search portals such as Yahoo and Google 
that rely on complex algorithms to determine the news consumers readily view (Sundar 
& Nass, 2001; Ekdal, Thorson, & Vraga, 2010).  Researchers are also concerned that the 
process of focusing on narrow content is troublesome for the function of modern 
democracy (Katz, 1996).  The fragmentation of news media specifically has led to a 
dramatic increase in ideological political coverage.  How individuals select news 
influences knowledge of current events as well as how they assess public issues.   
Access to news on the Internet further encourages fragmentation, if only that 
Internet user motivations tend to be the acquisition of specific rather than general 
information (e.g., Ferguson & Perse, 2000; Johnson, Kaye, Bichard, &Wong, 2007; Katz, 
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1997; Papacharissi & Rubin, 2000; Teo, 1999, Tewksbury, 2005 ).  Empirical evidence 
also suggests that the Internet is particularly conducive to creating and/or encouraging 
news audience specialization (e.g., Tewksbury & Althaus, 2000; Dutta-Bergman, 2004).  
Media technologies not only allow but encourage audience members to seek out, or 
selectively expose themselves to individual interests and needs (Sunstein, 2001; Webster 
& Phalen, 1997; Webster & Lin, 2002).  While exploring media economic models is 
outside the scope of this work, it is important to understand that fragmented media 
audiences provide media outlets an opportunity to profit as they are able to offer up 
specific demographic groups to advertisers, e.g. gender, income, race, political affiliation.  
As a result, news and information channels continue to intentionally skew their content. 
Studies of Objectivity 
Objectivity is semantic stand-in for “good’ journalism, and is almost universally 
accepted by journalists themselves (Steiner, 1998).  Even “the nation’s most widely 
invoked code for individual journalist and news organizations” (Black, et al, 1993) from 
the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ)—the largest professional journalist 
association in the world—mandates comprehensive, factual, and objective reporting 
(Beasley, 1997).  “The most central concept in media theory relation to information 
quality has probably been that of objectivity, especially as applied to news information” 
(McQuail, 2005, p.200).  Credibility, objectivity, and truth have become so axiomatic 
when it comes to journalism that they are often taken for granted.  “Credibility is, after 
all, the most important thing a communicator has.  A communicator in the news media 
who lacks credibility probably also has no audience,” (Severin & Tankard, 2001).  
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Credibility is often ubiquitous with objectivity, though scholars and industry 
professionals alike decry objectivity as unattainable.  “Trust in news media means trust in 
their specific selectivity rather than in objectivity or truth” (Kohring & Matthes, 2007, p. 
239).  Objectivity as a tenant of journalism did, in fact, evolve (Schudson, 1978) and thus 
cannot be considered truly “universal”.  It is instead, as some scholars posit, “objectivity 
with a human face” (Ward, 1999).  Others go farther, attacking objectivity for being too 
detached and consequently inhumane (Bell, 1998), such as with the conflict in the 
Balkans that saw a calloused, detached press reporting on atrocities, “as if covering a 
football match, notwishtanding the travesties committed by one side against the other 
(Lavie & Lehman-Wilzig, 2005).  Indeed, experiments have shown that a public can 
simultaneously disagree with how a media outlet covers a story while still believing what 
it says (Center for Family Research, 1978).  Journalists themselves are also reluctant to 
transparently discuss factors that may interfere with presenting objective news to the 
public (Lavie & Lehman-Wilzig, 2005).   
McQuail notes that objectivity should not be confused with the notion of “truth”, 
but recognizes that it is another version of it.  Westerstahl (1983) observed that 
objectivity deals not only with facts but with the values of balance and neutrality.  
Observing and reporting are susceptible to being “contaminated by subjectivity” (p.200) 
and McQuail outlines the three main principles of objectivity as  
1.  The adoption of a position of detachment and neutrality towards the object of 
reporting. 
2.  There is lack of partisanship: not taking sides in matters of dispute or showing  
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bias. 
3.  Objectivity requires strict attachment to accuracy and other truth criteria (such 
as relevance and completeness. 
Objectivity then is an understanding and recognition of one-sided versus two-
sided messages, and the absence of personal opinion.  Objectivity, then, is more closely 
related with “perceived” credibility rather than “actual” credibility which is more closely 
related with the notion of truth.   Pew (2011) finds that perceptions of the media as 
favoring one side over the other have been on the rise since 1985 while perceptions that 
news organizations deal fairly with all sides has declined by nearly half between 1985 
(34%) and 2011 (16%) (See Figure 2).  Also of note, the partisan gap in perceptions of 
media accuracy and bias have become more uniform; Democrats and Independents have 
expressed increasingly critical views of the media with 57% of Democrats saying that 
news organizations are biased compared to 76% of Republicans (Pew, 2011).  
Perceptions that news organizations were politically biased in their reporting overall rose 
from 45% in 1985 to 63% in 2011.  This rise in biased reporting is not entirely due to 
increased demand from the public, since 63% of Americans say that they prefer news 
with no point of view; that preference is even stronger for online news consumers, 74% 
of whom prefer news without a political point of view (Pew, 2011).  This seems counter 
intuitive considering the selective nature of online news viewership.  Even when asked if 
they would prefer news from their own point of view, just 25% of respondents agreed 
(Pew, 2010).  However, this question by Pew highlights a pitfall of such questionnaires 
that this thesis proposes to correct for future research.  No one wants to freely admit to 
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preferring news from their own camp, which could be viewed as close-minded; and 
Internet users pride themselves on being open-minded.  They may even gravitate towards 
that news unconsciously.  There must be a better measurement scale that unobtrusively 
asks questions regarding an individual’s preference for one-sided or opinionated news.  
Accordingly, the following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
H1.  Opinionated news will be rated less credible than neutral news. 
 
 
Figure 2: Bias and Objectivity on Political and Social Issues in American News.  Data 
Source: Pew, 20112 
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One of the first and most often cited studies on objectivity is Hovland, 
Lumsdaine, and Sheffield’s 1949 study for the United States Army.  They conducted an 
experiment to determine the effectiveness of one-sided versus two-sided messages on 
audiences who a) initially opposed the message and b) initially sympathetic to the 
message.  In this experiment, the message concerned the continuing length World War II 
in the wake of Germany’s surrender.  As hypothesized, the research team found that the 
one-sided or non-objective message was most effective with those whose beliefs initially 
aligned with the message, and that the two-sided or objective message was most effective 
with those opposed to the message.      
Hovland and his research team were more concerned with message persuasion 
than credibility, though we see from contemporary research that credibility perceptions 
tend to be higher when news consumers believe that the reporter’s point of view is 
aligned with their own (Johnson & Kaye; Metzger, Flanagin, & Medders, 2010; Stroud, 
2010).   Research also shows that Americans view the news sources they rely on most as 
far more accurate than the news media in general.  Sixty-two percent of respondents in a 
2011 Pew study reported that their main source for news gets the facts straight, which is 
double the figure for news in general. 
Also, news consumers tend to discredit information that runs counter to their own 
opinions (Nisbett, 1980) as well as find that messages that disagree with their opinions to 
be more biased and hostile (Eveland & Shah, 2003; Gunther, 1992; Gunther, Christen, 
Liebhart, & Chia, 2001; Perloff, 1989; Vallone, Ross, & Lepper, 1985). 
Accordingly, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
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H2.  Opinionated news will be rated higher in terms of credibility if aligned with      
                    previously held personal beliefs on life in prison for juveniles.  
H3.  News will be rated higher in terms of credibility by those participants  
        exposed to a news brand they rated as believable.   
 
Accepting Opinion, Rejecting Objectivity 
In preparation for the current study, two focus groups (12 and 9 participants 
respectively) were conducted in the winter of 2010 at a large southwestern University to 
act as a pretest.  In opposition to previous survey research and focus group research that 
sought to assess the credibility of specific news products, trust and credibility were 
examined in depth from a humanistic approach that got closer to credibility than previous 
research that defined credibility in limited, universalizing terms.  The purpose of the 
focus groups was to conceptualize a new scale to discreetly measure an individual’s 
reliance on or, conversely, rejection of opinion in news.  Previous large-scale national 
surveys (such as those conducted by Pew and Gallup) fail to adequately address how 
willing the individual may be in accepting a certain amount of bias and opinion in his or 
her news, since those studies do not attempt to ask the question indirectly.  It is the 
opinion of this researcher that semantics may play a role in how an individual responds to 
questioning their preference for opinion in news.  These focus groups were an initial step 
in determining if respondents might be more prone to acknowledging a preference for 
opinionated news if asked obliquely. 
 23 
Participants ranged in age from 20’s to 40’s, though the majority of participants 
were in their mid 20’s.  Participants filled out a questionnaire before each group 
discussion.  This provided demographic information and allowed for several questions to 
promote the participants to begin thinking about the topic for discussion.  One of the 
questions on the questionnaire asked participants to list three words that come to mind 
when they think of “credibility”, while the second focus group participants were asked to 
write a personal definition of credibility. While there was a danger of decontextualizing 
credibility by analyzing the questionnaires, it was helpful to understand basic tropes, or 
“buzz words” individuals understand when confronted with credibility and trust in the 
current media climate.  Through a rich and lively discussion, general conventions were 
challenged, and common themes of credibility emerged.   
The focus groups problematized the ways credibility and trust are operationalized 
in the majority of news media research.  Through just over two hours of rich discussion, 
common themes of news credibility emerged that complicated the common binary 
constructs used in the contemporary conceptualization of credibility, particularly the 
importance of objectivity and unbiased news.  Participants began the discussion with 
peripheral, fundamentalist statements about what credibility meant to them.  Several 
respondents contradicted their previous statements when continuing to self-evaluate their 
own news media practices and credibility processing throughout the focus groups. 
If I had to take truth versus objectivity, give me truth.  I think there’s a scale that 
we balance things on internally, and I think that’s why it’s so hard for someone to 
get credibility is because you’re weighing all these different things and you go no, 
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well, how much of this do I need versus this.  I mean there is no mathematical 
procedure for determining if somebody’s credible.   
Quotes like the one above presented an opportunity for future research to explore 
how individuals value different components of credibility, specifically opinion, 
objectivity, and bias.  News consumers may purport certain components of credibility as 
important, but when observed in an experimental setting, aspects of credibility such as 
objectivity and bias may have a more complicated relationship with credibility that is 
often ignored in historical research.  For instance, shouldn’t an individual have a way to 
express that objectivity and bias is not an important component of credibility?  Instead, 
they are simply assessing the mere presence of bias or opinion, not whether that matters 
to them.  Studies simply tack on “objectivity” and “bias” onto credibility matricies 
without considering that while an individual may recognize that a story is slanted, it does 
not necessarily mean it detracts from their overall perception of credibility.  This was 
illustrated by one focus group respondent in the following quote: 
I don’t think 100% objectivity is what we want.  I don’t think most people want 
that.  I think most people want an element of – If I had to take truth versus 
objectivity, give me truth. 
Most participants in the focus group eventually (often reluctantly) admitted that a certain 
amount of opinion has an “entertainment” quality, and that objectivity is not the end-all-
be-all. 
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I don’t necessarily need objective, but if you’re not going to be objective, say 
you’re not objective.  I don’t mind having a slant in news, but tell me that’s your 
slant.  Don’t try to hide it as fact. 
Based on these focus groups, a scale or index of items is needed in order to 
discretely measure and account for an individual’s acceptance of opinion separate from a 
knee-jerk response typical at the start of the focus groups.  From these preliminary, 
exploratory focus groups, the following statements and question were created: 
1. Sometimes it is ok for news to have an opinion. 
2. Accuracy is more important than telling both sides of the story. 
3. There is no place for opinion in mainstream news. 
4. How important is objectivity in news to you? 
With the creation of a new variable, the following research questions are posed: 
 
R1a.  Can a reliable scale be created to unobtrusively measure an individual’s 
acceptance of opinion and rejection of objectivity in news? 
 
The new scale, known as the Acceptance of Opinion Scale (AOS), could then be used as 
an intervening variable in studies of credibility and trust of opinion-based news such as 
punditry, partisan blogging, cable news, etc. 
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R1b.  Will opinionated news be more credible for those who score highly on the 
Acceptance of Opinion Scale? 
 
Cognitive Processing and Gender 
An experimental methodology can empirically test components of credibility 
matrices that are no longer ubiquitous in an increasing polarized news market:  bias and 
objectivity.  While psychological and advertising research has explored gendered 
differences in product and other information assessment, there appears to be a gap in 
gendered credibility perception research since credibility is often seen as a universal 
concept with universal (and tautological) components.  Additionally, while studies have 
frequently explored news preference by gender, there is a gap in the literature in how 
opinion news, gender, and credibility interact.   
 “When it comes to news, media users clearly show different information seeking 
behaviors depending on their socio-demographic characteristics such as sex, age, and 
level of education” (Knobloch-Westerwick, 2007).  Selective attention and exposure have 
been linked in journalism to gender.  Results of a 2007 experiment found that news 
consumers’ selective exposure was influenced by gender, in that women read more about 
social and interpersonal issues and men read more achievement and performance-oriented 
news (Knobloch-Westerwick, 2007).  A 2008 study of gendered responses to news 
frames found that women found greater enjoyment in positively frames news and men 
found more enjoyment and identified more with negatively framed news (Kamhawi & 
Grabe, 2008). 
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 Additionally, using the Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem, 1974) to establish gender 
as a psychological trait, a 2008 study found that gender has an impact on cognitive 
processing of media messages, specifically that the structure of written news (inverted 
pyramid versus chronological) can affect androgynous and gender-typed individuals 
differently.  The findings suggest that androgynous individuals spent more time 
constructing meaning during reading than subjects in other categories.   
While information-seeking as well as cognitive processing research regarding 
gender has been explored, it is rare in the context of news credibility perception.  This 
study attempts to analyze credibility perception differences between males and females.  
Most historic and current research runs statistical analysis to determine differences in 
credibility scores between men and women using construct matrices of credibility.  If no 
statistically significant differences emerge between genders in the score, such credibility 
constructs may appear on the surface to validate the universality of credibility.  However, 
psychological as well as advertising research tells us that there are inherent differences in 
information processing between genders. In advertising, differences between genders 
have historically been used as a basis for audience segmentation (Darley & Smith, 1995) 
and that women are more sensitive to “subtle” stimulus factors associated with ad 
processing (Lenny, et al., 1983; McGuiness & Pribram, 1979).    Women are also more 
attuned to their personal emotional state than men (Allen & Haccoun, 1976) and 
consequently place a higher premium on these insights (Dubé & Morgan, 1998).  
Previous research also typifies males as more analytical and logical; they have also been 
found to use more physical attributes when conceptualizing items, as well as use fewer 
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adjectives.  Indeed, men are found to be more receptive of objective claims over 
subjective claims in advertising when they engage in heuristic processing and also that 
objective claims are the salient focus.  Men are often portrayed as more analytical and 
logical in their processing while women are more subjective and intuitive (Broverman et 
al. 1968).  It may be because of this that men are more receptive to objective (rather than 
subjective) claims when they are fully engaged and the objective claim is both salient and 
focal. Conversely, women are able to process objective and subjective claims on a 
comprehensive level (Darley & Smith, 1993).  Researchers have also found that women 
process information more subjectively than men, and thus demand different advertising 
methods that are targeted by gender (Prakash & Flores, 1985).   
  Objectivity and subjectivity can thus be understood as two ends of a continuum 
of verifiability of information.  Objective claims (as in news, perhaps) contain tangible 
attributes along with factual descriptions” (Darley & Smith, 1993; Edell & Staelin, 1983; 
Holbrook, 1978).  Conversely, subjective claims contain intangible qualities and more 
impressionistic attributes.  According to Holbrook (1978), an “objective” claim 
encompassed two dimensions: first that a claim about a brand is associated with a 
tangible feature of a product, and second, that a claim includes specific factual 
information.  On the other end of the spectrum, subjective claims are, “emotional, 
subjective impressions of intangible aspects of a product.”  The language of these 
objective and subjective claims is not “sex-neutral” (Allen, 1987); neither text nor 
language can be sex-neutral, but is instead a “vehicle for conveying different cultural 
expectations and value systems for men and for women” (Stern, 1999, p.4).  Of note is 
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that differences between male and female information processing and interpretive 
strategies that are based in childhood experiences can also be applied to other 
divergences that distinguish one group of people from another (Stern, 1999). 
Given objectivity’s connection with credibility and men’s predispositions for 
objective fact-based claims, the following questions are posed: 
 
R2a.  Will men score lower than women on the Acceptance of Opinion scale? 
R2b.  Will women rate opinionated news as more credible than men? 
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Chapter 3:  Method 
PROCEDURE 
The hypotheses were tested in an experiment embedded in a Web survey in which 
participants viewed a fictitious online news story about policy changes for life in prison 
for juvenile offenders.  Participants were recruited through a public records request of 
public university email addresses.  Universities were chosen at random from a list of all 
public institutions in the United States.  Participants were students (undergraduate and 
graduate), faculty, and staff above the age of 18 and were contacted through an email 
flyer with an incentive of entrance into a drawing for one of two Visa gift cards valued at 
$100.  A total of 6,609 individuals began taking the survey, with 4,897 completing it 
(74%).  The survey remained active between June 30 and August 30 of 2011.  Along with 
the initial invitation, potential participants were sent two reminder emails at two week 
intervals.   
Participants were 64% female and 36% male with a median age of 23 and median 
household income of $50,000 to $59,000.  They were primarily single (67%) with 31% 
reporting to be married or divorced.  Participants were primarily Caucasian (76%), with 
the next largest group being Black or African American (7%) and 3% Hispanic.  As is 
typical of social science studies that utilize primarily student populations, the participants 
were highly educated; only 5% reported earning a high school diploma or less while 19% 
reported having a Master’s or Doctoral Degree.   Eight percent declined to answer.  
Participants tended to lean towards the Democratic Party on social issues (58% to 42%), 
but leaned towards the Republican Party on economic issues (59% to 41%).  A little more 
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than half (58%) considered themselves Democrats, or “leaning” towards the Democratic 
Party.  It is important to note here that while a diverse sample is important to empirical 
research, this is not a generalizable survey study, but rather an experimental 
methodology.  While the response rate was relatively low (just under 10%), it is less 
important since internal validity trumps concerns with external validity in this instance.    
 The study used a 3 (news brand New York Times, Fox, or MSNBC) X 3 (neutral, 
pro-issue, or anti-issue) between-subject design, where brand was manipulated using 
equally sized and placed digital logos and neutrality was manipulated by including or 
omitting sentences of equal length in favor, in opposition, or neutral in tone towards the 
issue of life in prison for juveniles.   
 Respondents read a news story concerned with the 2010 Supreme Court decision 
regarding life in prison for juveniles (LIPJ).  The rational for choosing this topic was to 
find a salient issue that while at times partisan, not nearly as polarizing and incendiary as 
other topics such as abortion or gun rights.   The neutral story was written to provide a 
balanced summary of the two positions regarding the issue (see appendices A through I 
for full text of the news story).  The pro-LIPJ and anti-LIPJ stories included additional 
statements, both objective and subjective in nature, that promoted one position on the 
issue over the other  (i.e. “Absent an ability to do this, and in light of what science tells us 
about the capacity for adolescents to change, it makes no sense to lock up any young 
offender and throw away the key”).  The news organizations of the New York Times, Fox, 
and MSNBC were chosen due to their prominence, salience, as well as reputations.  In 
2011, Pew asked respondents what first came to mind when they thought of “news 
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organizations”.  A majority of respondents named cable news outlets; 39% named Fox 
and 12% named MSNBC, and 5% named the New York Times.   
Portions of the story were from a New York Times Op-Ed article titled “The 
Young and the Reckless”, published November 13, 2009.  The authors’ names, Elizabeth 
S. Scott and Laurence Steinberg, were used in the bylines of all experimental conditions.  
Participants were asked if they were familiar with the authors before today, and if they 
were familiar with the specific article before today as manipulation checks.  Only 1% of 
participants reported being familiar with the news story and 3% reported being familiar 
with the authors.  
MEASURES 
Control Variables (See Table 4) 
In addition to general demographic questions, various scales and items were included in 
order to isolate the effects of the experimental manipulations of opinion and brand on 
news story credibility.  These included Issue Salience, Propensity to Trust, Opinion 
towards Life in Prison for Juveniles (LIPJ), Environment, Believability of News Brands, 
News Elaboration, Social Politics, and the proposed Acceptance of Opinion Scale (AOS).   
To avoid pitfalls of earlier credibility research that failed to account for 
participant interest in the news topic, Issue Salience was measured using 4 items, where 
participants were asked to rate how interesting, important, relevant, and enjoyable they 
found the article on a 10-point scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree 
(Cronbach’s α = .87).  Propensity to Trust was measured using 4 items, “I usually trust 
people”, “I give people the benefit of the doubt”, “I trust new acquaintances”, and “I trust 
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the United States judicial system”.  The statements were evaluated on a 10-point scale 
ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree (Cronbach’s α = .76).  The first three 
statements are standard on traditional scales used to measure propensity to trust.  While 
the alpha is relatively low, due to the nature of the subject matter involving the United 
States judicial system, trust in the judicial branch of government is important as a 
variable in the index.   
Opinion towards LIPJ was measured by asking participants their level of 
agreement of the statement “Sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without the possibility 
of parole should be illegal” on a 10-point scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly 
Agree. They were also asked if juveniles should be eligible for the death penalty (which 
is currently illegal under U.S. law based on a previous Supreme Court decision) using the 
same scale.  The items were repeated after the manipulation to account for article 
influence on opinion. 
  Because this was a survey-based experiment, it was important to control for 
environment as much as possible.  Participants were asked to describe the environment in 
which they completed the survey (e.g. on a home computer, on a school computer), if 
they were forced to pause or stop taking the survey, and if so, why.  
 Believability of News Brands was measured using a 10-point scale from Strongly 
Disagree to Strongly Agree, asking participants, “Please rate how much you think you 
can believe each of the following news organizations” (See Figure 3).  This mirrors 
Pew’s own credibility question and their list of 18 news outlets, including USA Today, 
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CNN, MSNBC, The New York Times, Fox News, and The National Inquirer. (See Table 
3) 
Table 3: Believability of News Brands Pretest 
NYT Pro-Issue (Range = 9) M SD 
USA Today 7.15 2.074 
Wall Street Journal 7.66 2.056 
New York Times 7.63 2.137 
Daily Newspaper 7.32 2.03 
CNN 7.11 2.261 
Fox News 5.59 2.93 
MSNBC 6.54 2.352 
ABC News 6.9 2.143 
CBS News 6.91 2.143 
NBC News 6.95 2.162 
Local TV News 7.12 2.102 
C-Span 7.32 2.144 
The PBS NewsHour 7.4 2.144 
60 minutes 7.25 2.118 
NPR 7.36 2.337 
Time Magazine 7.14 2.21 
People Magazine 4.61 2.389 
National Inquirer 2.92      2.6 
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Figure 3: Mean Ratings for News Organization Believability Pretest.  Maximum 
response is 10. 
 News Elaboration was measured using four items, asking participants how often 
they find themselves “thinking about what I’ve seen or read in the news”, “tie what I see 
or read in the news to ideas I’ve had before”, “try to relate what I see or read in the news 
to my own personal experiences”, and, “think about how what I see or read in the news 
relates to other things I know” on a 10-point scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly 
Agree (Cronbach’s α = .91). 
 As noted previously, the experiment included questions to determine the social 
politics of the participants.  Two items were included that asked participants to move a 
sliding-scale to position themselves between the Republican and Democratic parties in 














The Acceptance of Opinion Scale was created from four questions (two of which 
were reverse-coded) to determine an individual’s attitude towards opinion in news.  
Three of the items were measured on a 10-point scale from Strongly Disagree to Strongly 
Agree  The statements were, “Sometimes it is ok for news to have an opinion”, 
“Accuracy is more important than telling both sides of the story”, “There is no place for 
opinion in mainstream news”.  The scale also included the question, “How important is 
objectivity in news to you?” on a 10-point scale from Not Important at all to Very 
Important.  Due to an unacceptably low Cronbach’s α of .41 , two of the items were 
removed from analysis so as to include only “Sometimes it is ok for news to have an 
opinion” and “There is no place for opinion in mainstream news” (Cronbach’s α.= 71). 
Dependent Variable 
Credibility 
Participants were asked to evaluate the credibility of the news story using a scale 
comprised of 12 items, each on a 10-Point Scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to 
Strongly Agree.  Participants were asked to rate how Trustworthy, Unbelievable, 
Reliable, Authoritative, Inaccurate, Honest, Biased, Credible, Knowledgeable, Dynamic, 
Informative, and Objective they found the news (Cronbach’s alpha = .89).  This scale 
was comprised of measures from previous studies but with several of the items reverse-




Table 4: Independent and Dependent Variable Scales 
Scale/Variable M SD Range 
Salience 26.68 7.46 36 
Credibility 73.95 15.78 108 
Acceptance of Opinion 
Scale 9.76 4.75 18 
Propensity to Trust 24.41 6.44 36 
Life in Prison for Juveniles 5.84 2.99 9 
Social Politics 41.43 30.34 100 




Chapter 4:  Results   
HYPOTHESIS 1 
 For H1, that opinionated news will be rated less credible than neutral news, a t-
test was conducted that analyzed credibility scores of respondents within what brand of 
news to which they were exposed, the New York Times, Fox, and MSNBC.  The study 
found that among respondents who viewed a New York Times article, neutral news had 
statistically significant higher credibility ratings than opinionated news (t (1023.76) =  -
6.090, p < .001, with a Mean credibility score of 783 for the neutral story and a Mean 
credibility score of 73 for the opinionated conditions (See Figure 4).  Even when a using 
a credibility matrix that omitted the items of “Objectivity” and “Bias” (Cronbach’s α = 
.91), the results of the t-test were still significant (t (1594) = -4.175, p < .001, showing 
that the neutral story (Mean credibility 67) was still more credible than either of the 
opinionated stories (Mean credibility 63)4.  This secondary credibility matrix was tested 
as to alleviate the concern of tautology, that respondents were identifying qualities that 
the story contained rather than assessing them in terms of credibility.  While results 
varied slightly, the neutral condition was still statistically significantly more credible. 
A similar result was found for Fox stories, where the neutral story (credibility 
Mean of 76) was more credible than the opinionated stories (credibility Mean of 72) (t 
(1656) = -5.102, p < .001).  When using the credibility matrix without “Objectivity” and 
“Bias”, the results held , with neutral story credibility at 64 and opinionated story 
                                               
3 A maximum credibility score of 120 was possible by rating “10” to every item in the credibility matrix. 
4 A maximum credibility score of 100 was possible by rating “10” to every item in the secondary 
credibility matrix. 
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credibility at 62 (t (1656) = -2.933, p = .003).  For the MSNBC articles, neutral news was 
more credible than opinionated news, 76 to 72 accordingly (t (1668) = -5.779, p < .001).  
When using the secondary credibility matrix omitting “Objectivity” and “Bias, results 
remained similarly significant, where the neutral story was found to be more credible 
than the opinionated story, 65 to 63.   (t (1670) = -3.362, p < .001). Hypothesis 1 is thus 
universally supported. 
 
Figure 4: Mean Credibility Scores by Experimental Conditions.  A maximum 


















For H2, that opinionated news will be rated higher in terms of credibility if 
aligned with previously held beliefs on life in prison for juveniles, a two-way analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted across all nine story conditions.  For all story 
conditions, a preliminary analysis evaluating the homogeneity-of-regression (slopes) 
assumption indicated that the relationship between the covariates (Believability of News 
Brand, Issue Salience, Propensity to Trust, News Elaboration, and AOS) and the 
dependent variable (Credibility) did not differ significantly as a function of the 
independent variables (LIPJ Score and Social Politics).  In all conditions, the relationship 
between the covariates and credibility did not differ significantly as a function of belief in 
LIPJ or politics on social issues.  There was homogeneity of variance between groups as 
assessed by Levene’s test for equality of error variance in all instances except for the 
MSNBC pro-issue condition.  However, H2 was not supported.  In certain cases, the 
reversal was true, that opinionated news that aligned with personal attitudes towards LIPJ 
was found to be less credible. 
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Table 5: Analysis of Covariance for Credibility by Belief in Life in Prison for 
Juveniles- New York Times 
Condition SS df MS F p 
NYT Anti-Issue      
Belief in LIPJ 591.679 1 591.679 3.314 .070 
Social Politics 130.050 1 130.050 .728 .394 
Social Politics*LIPJ 132.553 1 132.553 .742 .390 
Error 41601.625 233    
Total 62909.769 241    
NYT Pro-Issue      
Belief in LIPJ 4.611 1 4.611 .019 .890 
Social Politics 1.728 1 1.728 .007 .933 
Social Politics*LIPJ .344 1 .344 .001 .970 
Error 59088.990 244    
Total 77772.696 252    
NYT Neutral      
Belief in LIPJ 4.397 1 4.397 .026 .873 
Social Politics 7.269 1 7.269 .042 .837 
Social Politics*LIPJ 25.918 1 25.918 .150 .698 
Error 41520.889 241    
Total 65980.576 249    
 
New York Times Condition 
 For the three New York Times story condition, there were no significant 
interactions between the effects of opinion towards LIPJ and social politics on credibility 
(see Table 5).   
Fox News Condition 
 For the Fox News story condition,  simple main effects analysis of the anti-LIPJ 
condition showed that among social Democrats, those who are pro-LIPJ found the story 
to be more credible than those social Democrats who are anti-LIPJ (p = .024) (see Table 
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6 and Figure 5).  There were no differences found among social Republicans (p = .076).  
There were no significant interactions between the effects of opinion towards LIPJ and 
social politics on credibility. 
 
                  Fox Anti-LIPJ Credibility 
  
Figure 5: Credibility Ratings among Social Democrats for Fox “Anti-Life in Prison 
for Juveniles” Condition.  A maximum credibility score of 120 is possible.  From left to 

























Social Democrats who are Pro LIPJ Social Democrats who are Anti LIPJ
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Social Democrats
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Table 6: Analysis of Covariance for Credibility by Belief in Life in Prison for 
Juveniles- Fox News 
Condition SS df MS F p 
Fox Anti-Issue      
Belief in LIPJ 1344.262 1 1344.262 6.066 .014 
Social Politics 140.725 1 140.725 .635 .426 
Social Politics*LIPJ 46.764 1 46.764 .211 .646 
Error 53407.193 241    
Total 79129.056 249    
Fox Pro-Issue      
Belief in LIPJ 43.293 1 43.293 .187 .666 
Social Politics 77.440 1 77.440 .334 .564 
Social Politics*LIPJ 243.417 1 243.417 1.051 .306 
Error 56498.372 244    
Total 84713.897 252    
Fox Neutral      
Belief in LIPJ 418.332 1 418.332 2.297 .131 
Social Politics 79.017 1 79.017 .434 .511 
Social Politics*LIPJ .423 1 .423 .002 .962 
Error 52454.946 288    
Total 77598.875 296    
 
MSNBC Condition 
 For those participants who read one of the three MSNBC story conditions, simple 
main effects analysis of the anti-LIPJ condition showed that among Social Republicans, 
those who are pro-LIPJ rated the story as more credible than those social Republicans 
who are anti-LIPJ (p < .001) (See Figure 6).  Additionally, simple main effects found that 
among those who are anti-LIPJ, social Democrats rated the story as more credible than 
social Republicans (p = .002) (See Figure 7).  There were no significant interactions 
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between the effects of opinion towards LIPJ and social politics on credibility (see Table 
7).   
             MSNBC Anti-LIPJ Credibility 
 
Figure 6: Credibility Ratings Among Social Republicans for MSNBC  “Anti-Life in 
Prison for Juveniles” Condition.  Max credibility score of 120 is possible.  
From left to right, SD = 13.5137 and SD = 17.7217. 
 
             MSNBC Anti-LIPJ Credibility 
 
Figure 7: Credibility Ratings Among Social Republicans and Social Democrats for 
MSNBC  “Anti-Life in Prison for Juveniles” Condition.  Max credibility 
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Table 7: Analysis of Covariance for Credibility by Belief in Life in Prison for 
Juvenile- MSNBC 
Condition SS df MS F p 
 MSNBC Anti-Issue      
Belief in LIPJ 1168.551 1 1168.551 6.105 .014 
Social Politics 1185.105 1 1185.105 6.191 .014 
Social Politics*LIPJ 62.458 1 62.458 .326 .568 
Error 46898.932 245    
Total 76166.614 253    
MSNBC Pro-Issue**      
Belief in LIPJ 278.493 1 278.493 1.819 .179 
Social Politics 542.983 1 542.983 3.547 .061 
Social Politics*LIPJ 166.518 1 166.518 1.088 .298 
Error 39039.502 255    
Total 59233.360 263    
MSNBC Neutral      
Belief in LIPJ 238.068 1 238.068 1.212 .272 
Social Politics 25.423 1 25.423 .129 .719 
Social Politics*LIPJ 214.944 1 214.944 1.094 .296 
Error 54608.342 278    
Total 73998.509 286    
 






H3 stated that news would be rated higher in credibility for those participants 
exposed to a news brand they believe.  The mean believability score was calculated for 
New York Times, Fox News, and MSNBC (M = 7.63, 5.59, and 6.54 respectively) from 
answers from a pretest that participants completed prior to exposure to the stimuli.  The 
variables were split at one standard deviation from the mean in either direction to create a 
variable of “Cannot Believe All or Most” and “Believe All or Most”.  For those who 
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were exposed to a New York Times condition, a t-test revealed statistically significant 
differences in credibility scores between those who rated the New York Times as 
believable in the pretest (M = 81.60, SD = 17.31) and those who rated the New York 
Times as unbelievable in the pretest (M = 65.41, SD = 14.04), t(616.43) = -12.84, p = .000 
(See Figure 8).  Additional t-tests were performed and found statistically significant 
differences in credibility scores between those who were exposed to the a Fox News 
condition and who rated Fox News as believable in the pretest (M = 79.53, SD = 15.41) 
and those who rated the organization as unbelievable (M = 66.21, SD = 17.58), t(696) = -
10.60, p = .000.  The final t-test also found a statistically significant difference in 
credibility scores between those who rated MSNBC as believable (M = 80.91, SD = 
16.94) and those who rated it as unbelievable (M = 66.20, SD = 15.81), t(649) = -11.46, p 
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Figure 8: Credibility of NYT, Fox, and MSNBC Conditions Separated by Brand 
Believers and Non-Believers Pretest.  A maximum credibility score of 120 
is possible.   
 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
R1a. addresses whether or not a reliable scale could be created to unobtrusively 
measure an individual’s acceptance of opinion and rejection of objectivity in news.  
While four items were originally created, two were thrown out due to a lack of reliability 
analysis.  The two items that remained were used to create an Acceptance of Opinion 
Scale with a score of 2 through 20.  R1b. asked if opinionated news would be more 
credible for those who score highly on the Acceptance of Opinion Scale.  The mean of 
the scale was calculated for all participants (M = 9.76 , SD = 4.75) and participants were 
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test was performed and found statistically significant differences in credibility scores for 
those accepting opinion in news (M = 77.24, SD = 15.97) and those rejecting opinion in 
news (M = 70.58, SD = 17.60), t(1269) = -6.87, p = .000. 
An addition finding concerned the relationship between the AOS and an 
individual’s propensity to trust.  Scores on the AOS were positively related to scores on 
the propensity to trust scale.  The propensity to trust scale was divided by standard 
deviation to make three groups, low trust, medium trust, and high trust individuals.  
Percentages for the three groups differed significantly according to Welch’s t-test, t(2 ) = 
22.675, p < .05, where individuals with low trust scored lower (M = 9.22) on the AOS 
scale than either medium trust (M = 9.80) or high trust (M = 10.26) individuals.  The 95% 
confidence interval of the differences is 0.22 to 0.94 points for low to medium trust 
individuals, 0.67 to 1.40 points for low to high trust, and 0.08 to 0.83 points for medium 
to high trust individuals. 
 The final research questions dealt with gender, credibility, and opinion.  R2a. 
asked if men would score lower than women on the AOS.  A t-test found no significant 
differences between men (M = 9.81, SD = 5.05), and women (M = 9.67, SD = 4.62), 
t(3329) = .92, p = .360 on the AOS.  R2b. asked if women would rate opinion news as 
more credible than men.  A series of 9 t-tests were performed, one for each story 
condition (see table 8).  Only the neutral New York Times condition showed statistical 
significance between men and women in terms of credibility, with women rating the story 
higher than men in terms of credibility.  The neutral Fox condition approached 
significance.  
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Table 8: Credibility by Story Condition and Gender 
Chapter 5:  Conclusion and Future Directions 
 The results of this study confirmed empirical research in some areas of news 
credibility research, challenged certain conceptions in others, and offered new avenues 
for exploration. Like other studies, this experiment showed that consumers are 
significantly affected by specific cues that accompany news stories in their process of 
accessing credibility.  The cues of news brand and freedom of opinion-laden statements 
were the strongest cues that affected how an individual rated a story in terms of 
credibility, while previously held beliefs on story topic were not strong credibility cues in 
this case.  Additionally, there was significant interaction with politics and belief in the 
thorny issue of life in prison for juveniles, though not in the ways anticipated.  In some 
conditions, social Democrats were less likely than Republicans to support life in prison 
for juveniles, while no significant findings were held in other conditions.  This supports 
                                                         Men                    Women  
Condition M SD M SD t (df) p  
New York Times Anti-LIPJ 73.21 15.95 71.89 14.02 .933(506)      .352       
New York Times Pro-LIPJ 75.49 16.57 73.84 15.56 1.14(506)       .264  
New York Times Neutral 76.16 15.12 79.94 15.96 -2.643(504) .008 
Fox Anti-LIPJ 71.64 16.49 71.08 15.64 .385(533) .700 
Fox Pro-LIPJ 71.61 17.92 73.31 16.14 -1.07(507) .286 
Fox Neutral 77.89 15.58 75.32 15.65 1.94(569) .056 
MSNBC Anti-LIPJ 69.57 15.63 70.51 15.47 -.672(539) .502 
MSNBC Pro-LIPJ 73.28 14.96 74.24 15.54 -0.681(529) .496 
MSNBC Neutral 76.35 15.35 76.95 14.73 -.452(563) .651 
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the researcher’s intent to find a story that crossed political boundaries, but perhaps to a 
point of detriment.   
The results of the experiment regarding previously held beliefs were surprising in 
that the hypothesis with the most established support in the literature relating credibility 
with affinity of opinion was not found to be significant, though believability of the news 
organization overall did correlate with higher credibility scores when an individual was 
exposed to that brand condition.   The more predisposed the respondent towards overall 
“believing” a particular brand, the more credible they found that news story.  An 
established affiliation with a news brand is, indeed, important to gaining credibility and 
trust; reputation is key, and once lost, may be difficult to regain.   
This finding, that previously held beliefs towards news brand correlates with 
credibility, is more noteworthy when put in the context of the other finding that 
previously held beliefs towards life in prison for juveniles was not found to correlate with 
credibility.  It is possible that extraneous variables not accounted for due to the quasi-
experimental nature of the study are the cause, or simply that the news topic was not 
particularly prominent or salient in the minds of the participants at the time of the 
investigation.  However, what is clear is that belief in the issue was not as important as 
belief in the news brand itself.  This has powerful implications for other research into 
previously held beliefs and credibility ratings, since the hypothesis appears to hold for 
some sets of belief systems but not others.  In the quest to find a news story topic that 
lacked dramatic political polarization, statistically significant findings on this particular 
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hypothesis might have been sacrificed.  This is admittedly not a particularly “hot button” 
issue, and had a relatively low level of salience and prominence for this set of 
participants.  Perhaps more prominent topics such as abortion rights or gun control might 
have proved a significant finding, though split more heavily along ideological lines.   
Future researchers should perform rigorous pretests on story topic alone, or when time 
and space allows, include story topics of varying subject matter to determine the interplay 
between specific topic, politics, and credibility perceptions.  Another question concerning 
how strongly the respondent felt about the topic would have helped account for apathetic 
respondents.  While a salience measure was used to find how interesting, enjoyable, etc. 
the story was, a second or third dimension should have been added to compare the 
salience of this topic with others in the current news cycle.  While most respondents 
found the topic salient (interesting, important, relevant, enjoyable), only 60% of 
respondents were familiar with the topic of the story before the day they read it.  Future 
research that manipulates story opinion content should include multiple story topics to 
avoid this pitfall.  After all, “familiarity is a precondition for trust” (Luhman, 1979).  In a 
2000 study of e-commerce, Gefen found that familiarity did indeed build trust.  And on a 
macro level, the whole of advertising is based on the notions of familiarity and trust 
(Arora & Stoner, 1996; Flavian, Guinalı´u, & Gurrea, 2006). 
 It was not surprising that branding in the form of a small logo had a significant 
effect on credibility.   While Fox and MSNBC did not differentiate from one another in 
terms of credibility, the New York Times was found to be far more credible, regardless of 
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whether the story was opinionated or neutral.  Print institutions may be considered the 
dinosaur of the digitized media age, but they still have a lot of weight to throw around.  It 
is problematic to compare two organizations primarily seen as television news with the 
print news goliath of the New York Times, but then it was not the purpose of this study to 
compare those different media institutions, but rather individual perception and personal 
affinity towards them.  This finding has strong implications for individual or “back-pack” 
journalists who report news independently from large institutions.  Establishing a 
consistent brand and familiarity has always been an important part of establishing trust 
with audience members.  But now more than ever in a saturated news environment with 
myriad online and offline choices, these branding concerns should remain top-of-mind 
for all journalists, whether associated with a major news institution or not, as  belief sets 
toward brand were found to be significantly related to credibility.  Establishing brand 
loyalty is not just a concern for tangible products like bath tissue or cheese slices; belief 
in brand translates to news products as well.  Additional research also could explore if 
mentioning news brands in the pretest in relation to one another primes individuals to 
elaborate on their belief systems towards those brands.  Might the degree to which an 
individual is asked to think about particular brands be related to the strength of the 
credibility assessment?  Other cues, such as reading additional articles by that brand, or 
even reminding the participant of past credibility blunders, i.e. Jayson Blair, might also 
prime respondents to elaborate on the beliefs systems that lend towards credibility 
assessments of an article under that news brand umbrella. 
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 Further research is also needed to create a more in-depth and theoretically 
grounded Acceptance of Opinion Scale (AOS), though preliminary results are promising, 
as this experiment makes an important first step towards addressing some consumers’ 
acceptance or preference for opinion in news.  The preliminary focus groups were 
conducted in order to theorize potential reliable measures to account for an individual’s 
acceptance of opinion in news to expand current credibility theory to consider individual 
weight (or exclusion in some cases) of credibility matrix items like objectivity and bias.  
Since the limited index of two items drew significant results, additional empirical and 
theoretical research into the idea of accepting opinion would be greatly beneficial to 
social science research into credibility theory within the current and (foreseeable future) 
fragmented news market.  There must be a way to unobtrusively arrive at an individual’s 
preference for opinion in news, since social desirability still seems to govern the news 
media consumer when it comes admitting a taste for tailor-flavored news.  Credibility 
theory relies heavily on the historical development of the importance of objectivity in 
news.  This remains a fundamental component of “good” journalism practice.  But a 
subset does prefer news with an opinion- Nearly 45% of respondents in this study agreed 
that opinion in news is ok.  Here, again, the case is made for the distinction in credibility 
theory semantics between “actual” credibility, and “perceived” credibility.  “Actual” 
credibility, then, can be understood as fact-based core news products.  “Perceived” 
credibility is the individual’s interpretation across a variety of common credibility 
components that were measured in this study. 
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 There was also a statistically significant relationship between propensity to trust 
and the AOS.  Trusting individuals were more likely to accept opinion in their news.  
While further research is needed to understand the reasons behind this correlation, it is in 
line with current theory that shows a link between personality, specifically agreeableness, 
propensity to trust, and knowledge sharing (Mooradian, Renzl, & Matzler, 2006).  If an 
individual is more trusting of information in general, then it stands that they are more 
trusting of individual opinions in their news; there is less cause to doubt the voracity of 
the information presented.  There is also evidence that low levels of trust in the 
government overall are related to low levels of trust in the media, and that the record low-
levels of trust in government are directly related to the decline in the trust of the media 
(Jones, 2004).  This is a rich area for exploration, where the AOS could be expanded to 
include elements of propensity to trust measures that include political as well as other 
areas of journalism. 
Journalism with an objective rarely is objective; but having secondary news 
sources with opinionated commentary can complement core news products that strive to 
be free of bias.  That news model is a healthy, democratic goal.  Unfortunately, the 
balance between partisan and objective news choices is increasingly tilting towards the 
former.  And that is not to say partisanship is a tilting canoe.  As drawn from Pew 
Research Center for People and the Press research (2009, 2011), the partisan news gap 
continues to grow, unchecked.  The proposed AOS measure is an attempt to illuminate 
audience segmentation and fragmentation issues, not only for scholars who have long 
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studied these concepts, particularly in the wake of a technology tidal wave, but for news 
consumers and news makers as well.  To be aware of personal biases is to recognize them 
in others. 
 It is also not particularly surprising that no significant differences were found 
between men and women on the two-item AOS measure.  From preliminary analysis, 
men and women appear to respond to the four different items quite differently.  This does 
not mean that credibility, or objectivity, is free of gender implications.  More analysis is 
needed before we can completely answer the question regarding women’s and men’s 
attitudes towards opinion in news.  Perhaps, though, it is faulty and dangerous logic to 
assume that advertising research into cognitive processing of subjective versus objective 
claims can be applied to journalism research.  To only think of news as a “product” is to 
lose sight of the other roles of journalism in a free, democratic society, the roles of 
watchdog and gatekeeper of information.  Additional focus groups must be conducted 
with a greater emphasis on gender.  A specific gender analysis was not conducted of 
these preliminary focus groups.  Men and women were not encouraged to consider any 
specific criteria that differentiates their credibility assessments from others in the room, 
but rather were encouraged to discuss how they individually conceptualize credibility.  
While advertising and psychology research tells us that men and women process 
subjective and objective claims differently, perhaps they still arrive at the same 
conclusion regarding news products. 
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 While credibility continues to crumble at pace with the shrinking demand for an 
unbiased, objective core news product, historic contexts in the study of credibility are 
more important than ever.  Credibility research should be standardized and rooted firmly 
in established theory.  Credibility scales and matrices should continue to be empirically 
tested while expanding the understanding of what a contemporary news audience will 
accept as credible, be that biased, opinion-laden, or self-assuring in a media saturated 
environment.  The scale proposed in this thesis is a synthesis of previous credibility 
studies.  It is not only the scale itself but the intervening variables of salience, propensity 
to trust, and the newly proposed AOS scale that make this method unique from others in 
the literature.  Granted, large-scale surveys such as those conducted by Pew cannot 
include as many extraneous variables; response rates do matter, particularly in national 
surveys that intend to be generalized to a wider audience.  That is what gives 
experimental approaches such as this one new breadth, since there is room to explore rich 
concepts and “unpack” traditional scales so that the individual consumer snapshot is more 
accurate and less ambiguous.  That is why with only two preliminary focus groups, this 
thesis was able to create the beginnings of a valuable tool in credibility research that 
takes into account both predisposition towards opinionated news as well as countering 
effects of social desirability that tell individuals that objectivity is universally bad.  It is 
not categorical.  Objectivity in news is an evolutionary process, one which this thesis 
attempts to freeze in time.  Objective news is absolutely necessary, a core news product 
free from commentary is essential.  But so is free expression.  Individuals need to process 
an alarming amount of information.  If opinion-based news assists in settling cognitive 
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dissonance, then it has earned its real estate on television, in print, on the radio, and on 
the Internet. 
 While the alarmist language of scholars and professionals regarding the downfall 
of news credibility should not be understated, there is also cause to curb it.   The press is 
still a more trusted source of information than federal, state, and local governments, the 
Obama administration, or business corporations (Pew, 2011).  As far as institutionalized 
information distribution, the press is far ahead of the pack.  Local news sources fare even 
better still, with 69% of respondents in a 2011 Pew study reporting that they trust all or 
some of the information from local news organizations compared to 59% for national 
news organizations.  Skepticism is as important to journalism as it is to democracy.  As 
Thomas Jefferson said of skepticism, “Bigotry is the disease of ignorance, of morbid 
minds; enthusiasm of the free and buoyant. Education and free discussion are the 
antidotes of both.” 
  Credibility and objectivity are evolving concepts.  This study put credibility 
ratings in an historical context of how the concept has evolved over its research lifespan 
and has also expanded the dialogue surrounding credibility research and theory by 
suggesting that researchers consider the relationships between objectivity, bias, and 
credibility in a diverse news media market where branding (ideological or corporate) is 
commonplace.  Journalists and newsmakers need to be prescient regarding the roll of 
opinionated news in relation to other news products.   We trust what is credible to us.  
Certain belief systems dictate how and what we choose to trust.  That trust is a 
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complexity of psychology, life experience, and other contextual factors that will always 
vary by the individual news consumer.  But researchers and industry professionals alike 
will continue to ask more questions in different ways, hoping to gain insight to influence 
policy and standard practices, all to inform, engage, and inspire the contemporary news 





















The Young and the Reckless  
By ELIZABETH S. SCOTT and LAURENCE STEINBERG 
  
ON Monday, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in two cases that ask 
whether sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without the possibility of parole is a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 
  
Those who hope the court will ban this sort of sentencing point to the 2005 decision in Roger v. 
Simmons, in which the court abolished the juvenile death penalty. They believe that the logic the 
justices applied in Roper to exclude minors from capital punishment should extend to life without 
parole as well. 
  
Those who hope the justices will retain life sentences for juveniles argue that “death is different,” 
and that the court should exercise restraint, as it typically does when reviewing non-capital 
sentencing decisions for fairness under the proportionality principle. 
  
You can imagine someone who is a month short of his 18th birthday, and you are saying that, no 
matter what this person does -- commits the most horrible series of non-homicide offenses that 
you can imagine, a whole series of brutal rapes, assaults -- that person must at some point be 
made eligible for parole.  Why does a juvenile have a constitutional right to hope but an adult 
does not? 
  
A crucial lesson of the Roper case was that the developmental differences between adolescents 
and adults are important under the Eighth Amendment, as they are in other areas of constitutional 
law. In deciding to end the juvenile death penalty, the court repeatedly emphasized the relative 
immaturity of minors, even at age 17, as compared to adults — a point that is well established in 
behavioral research and finds growing support in brain science. 
  
Writing for the majority in Roper, Justice Anthony Kennedy observed that juveniles’ impulsivity, 
recklessness and susceptibility to peer pressure made them inherently less responsible than 
adults. Justice Kennedy also noted juveniles’ potential for rehabilitation, because their personality 
and character traits are less fixed than adults. 
  
In the years since the Roper ruling, research on adolescent brain and behavioral development 
has provided additional support for Justice Kennedy’s observations. There is now a consensus 
among neuroscientists, for example, that brain regions and systems responsible for foresight, 
self-regulation, risk assessment and responsiveness to social influences continue to mature into 
young adulthood. This evidence that adolescents are psychologically and neurologically less 
mature than adults should be important in deciding how to punish their criminal acts. 
  
In Monday’s oral argument, the justices did not question the proposition that juveniles generally 
are psychologically less mature than adults. The debate focused instead on whether the 




Some justices argued instead that age and maturity should be considered in sentencing on a 
case-by-case basis. But this approach was rejected by the court in Roper — but should not be 
rejected here as well.  As Roper recognized, even psychological experts are unable to distinguish 
between the young person whose crime reflects transient immaturity and the rare juvenile 
offender who may deserve the harsh sentence of life without parole. 
  
The two Florida offenders whose cases will be decided by the court differ in age and in their 
offenses: Terrance Graham was sentenced to life without parole for a probation violation involving 
a house break-in at age 17, while Joe Sullivan was convicted of sexual assault at age 13. 
  
It is possible that the court will treat these two cases differently. But in both cases, the lower court 
decisions should not be struck down. 
  
We question any distinction drawn between killings and other sorts of violent crimes. The court is 
quite willing to accept that a 17-year-old who pulls the trigger on a firearm can demonstrate 
sufficient depravity and irredeemability to be denied re-entry into society, but insists that a 17-
year-old who rapes an 8-year-old and leaves her for dead does not.  That seems illogical. 
Such a sentence offends “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society,” the court’s announced standard for reviewing state punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. Indeed, in our opinion, life without parole should be determined on a case by case 
basis, even for a juvenile. 
  
There is no question that teenagers who commit serious crimes should be held accountable and 
punished, and that society must be protected from young people who are violent and dangerous. 
  
But states should have the discretion they have long been given to decide how harshly young 
criminals should be prosecuted. Thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia and the federal 
government have laws allowing life-without-parole sentences for juveniles convicted of non-
homicide offenses. That represents a super-majority of states in favor of the punishment. 
  
And only 129 juvenile offenders have been convicted under such laws. That a punishment is 
rarely imposed demonstrates nothing more than a general consensus that it should be just that — 






The Young and the Reckless  
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ON Monday, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in two cases that ask 
whether sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without the possibility of parole is a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 
  
Those who hope the court will ban this sort of sentencing point to the 2005 decision in Roger v. 
Simmons, in which the court abolished the juvenile death penalty. They believe that the logic the 
justices applied in Roper to exclude minors from capital punishment should extend to life without 
parole as well. 
  
Those who hope the justices will retain life sentences for juveniles argue that “death is different,” 
and that the court should exercise restraint, as it typically does when reviewing non-capital 
sentencing decisions for fairness under the proportionality principle. 
  
You can imagine someone who is a month short of his 18th birthday, and you are saying that, no 
matter what this person does -- commits the most horrible series of non-homicide offenses that 
you can imagine, a whole series of brutal rapes, assaults -- that person must at some point be 
made eligible for parole.  Why does a juvenile have a constitutional right to hope but an adult 
does not? 
  
A crucial lesson of the Roper case was that the developmental differences between adolescents 
and adults are important under the Eighth Amendment, as they are in other areas of constitutional 
law. In deciding to end the juvenile death penalty, the court repeatedly emphasized the relative 
immaturity of minors, even at age 17, as compared to adults — a point that is well established in 
behavioral research and finds growing support in brain science. 
  
Writing for the majority in Roper, Justice Anthony Kennedy observed that juveniles’ impulsivity, 
recklessness and susceptibility to peer pressure made them inherently less responsible than 
adults. Justice Kennedy also noted juveniles’ potential for rehabilitation, because their personality 
and character traits are less fixed than adults. 
  
In the years since the Roper ruling, research on adolescent brain and behavioral development 
has provided additional support for Justice Kennedy’s observations. There is now a consensus 
among neuroscientists, for example, that brain regions and systems responsible for foresight, 
self-regulation, risk assessment and responsiveness to social influences continue to mature into 
young adulthood. This evidence that adolescents are psychologically and neurologically less 
mature than adults should be important in deciding how to punish their criminal acts. 
  
In Monday’s oral argument, the justices did not question the proposition that juveniles generally 
are psychologically less mature than adults. The debate focused instead on whether the 
mitigating trait of immaturity justified a categorical exclusion of juveniles from the sentence of life 
without parole. 
  
Some justices argued instead that age and maturity should be considered in sentencing on a 
case-by-case basis. But this approach was rejected by the court in Roper — but should not be 
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rejected here as well.  As Roper recognized, even psychological experts are unable to distinguish 
between the young person whose crime reflects transient immaturity and the rare juvenile 
offender who may deserve the harsh sentence of life without parole. 
  
The two Florida offenders whose cases will be decided by the court differ in age and in their 
offenses: Terrance Graham was sentenced to life without parole for a probation violation involving 
a house break-in at age 17, while Joe Sullivan was convicted of sexual assault at age 13. 
  
It is possible that the court will treat these two cases differently. But in both cases, the lower court 
decisions should not be struck down. 
  
We question any distinction drawn between killings and other sorts of violent crimes. The court is 
quite willing to accept that a 17-year-old who pulls the trigger on a firearm can demonstrate 
sufficient depravity and irredeemability to be denied re-entry into society, but insists that a 17-
year-old who rapes an 8-year-old and leaves her for dead does not.  That seems illogical. 
Such a sentence offends “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society,” the court’s announced standard for reviewing state punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. Indeed, in our opinion, life without parole should be determined on a case by case 
basis, even for a juvenile. 
  
There is no question that teenagers who commit serious crimes should be held accountable and 
punished, and that society must be protected from young people who are violent and dangerous. 
  
But states should have the discretion they have long been given to decide how harshly young 
criminals should be prosecuted. Thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia and the federal 
government have laws allowing life-without-parole sentences for juveniles convicted of non-
homicide offenses. That represents a super-majority of states in favor of the punishment. 
  
And only 129 juvenile offenders have been convicted under such laws. That a punishment is 
rarely imposed demonstrates nothing more than a general consensus that it should be just that — 
rarely imposed. It is not proof that the punishment is one the nation abhors. 
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The Young and the Reckless  
By ELIZABETH S. SCOTT and LAURENCE STEINBERG 
  
ON Monday, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in two cases that ask 
whether sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without the possibility of parole is a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 
  
Those who hope the court will ban this sort of sentencing point to the 2005 decision in Roper v. 
Simmons, in which the court abolished the juvenile death penalty. They believe that the logic the 
justices applied in Roper to exclude minors from capital punishment should extend to life without 
parole as well. 
  
Those who hope the justices will retain life sentences for juveniles argue that “death is different,” 
and that the court should exercise restraint, as it typically does when reviewing non-capital 
sentencing decisions for fairness under the proportionality principle. 
  
A crucial lesson of the Roper case is that the developmental differences between adolescents 
and adults are important under the Eighth Amendment, as they are in other areas of constitutional 
law. In deciding to end the juvenile death penalty, the court repeatedly emphasized the relative 
immaturity of minors, even at age 17, as compared to adults — a point that is well established in 
behavioral research and finds growing support in brain science. 
  
Writing for the majority in Roper, Justice Anthony Kennedy observed that juveniles’ impulsivity, 
recklessness and susceptibility to peer pressure made them inherently less responsible than 
adults. Justice Kennedy also noted juveniles’ potential for rehabilitation, because their personality 
and character traits are less fixed than adults. 
  
In the years since the Roper ruling, research on adolescent brain and behavioral development 
has provided additional support for Justice Kennedy’s observations. There is now a consensus 
among neuroscientists, for example, that brain regions and systems responsible for foresight, 
self-regulation, risk assessment and responsiveness to social influences continue to mature into 
young adulthood. This evidence that adolescents are psychologically and neurologically less 
mature than adults should be important in deciding how to punish their criminal acts. 
  
In Monday’s oral argument, the justices did not question the proposition that juveniles generally 
are psychologically less mature than adults. The debate focused instead on whether the 
mitigating trait of immaturity justified a categorical exclusion of juveniles from the sentence of life 
without parole. 
  
Some justices argued instead that age and maturity should be considered in sentencing on a 
case-by-case basis. But this approach was rejected by the court in Roper.  Roper recognized, 
even psychological experts are unable to distinguish between the young person whose crime 
reflects transient immaturity and the rare juvenile offender who may deserve the harsh sentence 
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offenses: Terrance Graham was sentenced to life without parole for a probation violation involving 
a house break-in at age 17, while Joe Sullivan was convicted of sexual assault at age 13. 
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It is possible that the court will treat these two cases differently.  Such a sentence offends “the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” the court’s 
announced standard for reviewing state punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 
  
There is no question that teenagers who commit serious crimes should be held accountable and 
punished, and that society must be protected from young people who are violent and dangerous, 
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has provided additional support for Justice Kennedy’s observations. There is now a consensus 
among neuroscientists, for example, that brain regions and systems responsible for foresight, 
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mitigating trait of immaturity justified a categorical exclusion of juveniles from the sentence of life 
without parole. 
  
Some justices argued instead that age and maturity should be considered in sentencing on a 
case-by-case basis. But this approach was rejected by the court in Roper — but should not be 
rejected here as well.  As Roper recognized, even psychological experts are unable to distinguish 
between the young person whose crime reflects transient immaturity and the rare juvenile 
offender who may deserve the harsh sentence of life without parole. 
  
The two Florida offenders whose cases will be decided by the court differ in age and in their 
offenses: Terrance Graham was sentenced to life without parole for a probation violation involving 
a house break-in at age 17, while Joe Sullivan was convicted of sexual assault at age 13. 
  
It is possible that the court will treat these two cases differently. But in both cases, the lower court 
decisions should not be struck down. 
  
We question any distinction drawn between killings and other sorts of violent crimes. The court is 
quite willing to accept that a 17-year-old who pulls the trigger on a firearm can demonstrate 
sufficient depravity and irredeemability to be denied re-entry into society, but insists that a 17-
year-old who rapes an 8-year-old and leaves her for dead does not.  That seems illogical. 
Such a sentence offends “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society,” the court’s announced standard for reviewing state punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. Indeed, in our opinion, life without parole should be determined on a case by case 
basis, even for a juvenile. 
  
There is no question that teenagers who commit serious crimes should be held accountable and 
punished, and that society must be protected from young people who are violent and dangerous. 
  
But states should have the discretion they have long been given to decide how harshly young 
criminals should be prosecuted. Thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia and the federal 
government have laws allowing life-without-parole sentences for juveniles convicted of non-
homicide offenses. That represents a super-majority of states in favor of the punishment. 
  
And only 129 juvenile offenders have been convicted under such laws. That a punishment is 
rarely imposed demonstrates nothing more than a general consensus that it should be just that — 







The Young and the Reckless  
By ELIZABETH S. SCOTT and LAURENCE STEINBERG 
  
ON Monday, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments in two cases that ask 
whether sentencing a juvenile to life in prison without the possibility of parole is a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. 
  
Those who hope the court will ban this sort of sentencing point to the 2005 decision in Roper v. 
Simmons, in which the court abolished the juvenile death penalty. They believe that the logic the 
justices applied in Roper to exclude minors from capital punishment should extend to life without 
parole as well. 
  
Those who hope the justices will retain life sentences for juveniles argue that “death is different,” 
and that the court should exercise restraint, as it typically does when reviewing non-capital 
sentencing decisions for fairness under the proportionality principle. 
  
Certainly, death is different. But the sentence of life in prison without parole is also different from 
even lengthy conventional sentences; it is a judgment that an offender will never be fit to rejoin 
civil society, however long he lives. This punishment may be suitable for adults who have 
committed terrible crimes, but it is never a fair sentence for a juvenile, whose character is 
unformed and whose involvement in crime reflects the immature judgment of adolescence. 
  
A crucial lesson of the Roper case is that the developmental differences between adolescents 
and adults are important under the Eighth Amendment, as they are in other areas of constitutional 
law. In deciding to end the juvenile death penalty, the court repeatedly emphasized the relative 
immaturity of minors, even at age 17, as compared to adults — a point that is well established in 
behavioral research and finds growing support in brain science. 
  
Writing for the majority in Roper, Justice Anthony Kennedy observed that juveniles’ impulsivity, 
recklessness and susceptibility to peer pressure made them inherently less responsible than 
adults. Justice Kennedy also noted juveniles’ potential for rehabilitation, because their personality 
and character traits are less fixed than adults. 
  
In the years since the Roper ruling, research on adolescent brain and behavioral development 
has provided additional support for Justice Kennedy’s observations. There is now a consensus 
among neuroscientists, for example, that brain regions and systems responsible for foresight, 
self-regulation, risk assessment and responsiveness to social influences continue to mature into 
young adulthood. This evidence that adolescents are psychologically and neurologically less 
mature than adults should be important in deciding how to punish their criminal acts. 
  
In Monday’s oral argument, the justices did not question the proposition that juveniles generally 
are psychologically less mature than adults. The debate focused instead on whether the 
 68 
mitigating trait of immaturity justified a categorical exclusion of juveniles from the sentence of life 
without parole. 
  
Some justices argued instead that age and maturity should be considered in sentencing on a 
case-by-case basis. But this approach was rejected by the court in Roper — and it should be 
rejected here as well. As Roper recognized, even psychological experts are unable to distinguish 
between the young person whose crime reflects transient immaturity and the rare juvenile 
offender who may deserve the harsh sentence of life without parole. If experts can’t reliably make 
this determination, then it seems unlikely that juries and judges would be able to do much better. 
  
The two Florida offenders whose cases will be decided by the court differ in age and in their 
offenses: Terrance Graham was sentenced to life without parole for a probation violation involving 
a house break-in at age 17, while Joe Sullivan was convicted of sexual assault at age 13. 
  
It is possible that the court will treat these two cases differently. But in both cases, the lower court 
decisions should be struck down. For a minor to be confined in prison for life with no possibility of 
ever having the opportunity to demonstrate that he should be allowed to rejoin society is an 
egregious violation of the Eighth Amendment, especially for a crime in which no life was lost. 
  
Such a sentence offends “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society,” the court’s announced standard for reviewing state punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment. Indeed, in our opinion, life without parole is never a fair sentence for a juvenile, even 
in a murder case. 
  
There is no question that teenagers who commit serious crimes should be held accountable and 
punished, and that society must be protected from young people who are violent and dangerous. 
But studies show that the vast majority of juveniles who commit crimes — even very serious 
crimes — grow up to be law-abiding adults, and that it is impossible to predict which juvenile 
offenders will become career criminals. 
  
Absent an ability to do this, and in light of what science tells us about the capacity for adolescents 
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even psychological experts are unable to distinguish between the young person whose crime 
reflects transient immaturity and the rare juvenile offender who may deserve the harsh sentence 
of life without parole. 
  
The two Florida offenders whose cases will be decided by the court differ in age and in their 
offenses: Terrance Graham was sentenced to life without parole for a probation violation involving 
a house break-in at age 17, while Joe Sullivan was convicted of sexual assault at age 13. 
  
It is possible that the court will treat these two cases differently.  Such a sentence offends “the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” the court’s 
announced standard for reviewing state punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 
  
There is no question that teenagers who commit serious crimes should be held accountable and 
punished, and that society must be protected from young people who are violent and dangerous, 
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reflects transient immaturity and the rare juvenile offender who may deserve the harsh sentence 
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